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Abstract
Viewing individual contributions as investments in emission reduc-
tion we rely on the familiar linear public goods-game to set global reduc-
tion targets which, if missed, imply that all payoffs are destroyed with
a certain probability. Regulation by milestones does not only impose a
ﬁnal reduction target but also intermediate ones. In our leading example
the regulating agency is Mother Nature but our analysis can, of course,
be applied to other regulating agencies as well. We are mainly testing for
milestoneeffectsbyvaryingthesizeofmilestonesinadditiontochanging
the marginal productivity of individual contributions and the probability
to lose.
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In real life, a number of long-term projects rely on interim targets or milestones. For
individual choice problems imposing additional constraints may be detrimental for
efﬁciency. External regulation does not make much sense if individuals can cope with
problems on their own. However, this is different for collective choice problems. In
the economic domain we, indeed, observe milestones in social contexts mainly. For
instance, governments often announce ofﬁcial targets for budget reductions. Another
very prominent example is the GATT with its aim of constant liberalization of inter-
national trade, a goal which cannot be easily operationalized. Nevertheless, interim
targets have been regularly set in trade rounds. At the end of each round, the negoti-
ating parties agreed on an agenda to stepwise reduce barriers to trade within a certain
period.
A third example is environmental conservation. Here investments in climate pro-
tection could be imposed by an international environmental agreement (cf. Barrett
1994, 2003). It often includes a long term ﬁnal target which should be reached at a
certain date, e.g. reduction of total emissions until 2050 by about 50 per cent based
on the 1990 emissions (IPCC 2007).1 In such a situation milestones can proxy inter-
mediate abatement targets to keep total emissions below a critical threshold (e.g. the
emission reduction targets in the context of the Kyoto-protocol). If the international
community fails to approach these intermediate targets it gets more difﬁcult to reach
the ﬁnal threshold which then renders catastrophic events more likely.
The rationale for such milestones is to increase the intermediate credibility of pol-
icy announcement through commitment to testable intermediate goals. Thereby, the
government may overcome pressure from vested interests and measure a long term
oriented goal achievement by short term achievements. The three examples illus-
trate that often milestones are seen as disciplining factors for policy makers. In global
economic policy making, the evidence seems clear - GATT has achieved some con-
siderable progress with international comprehensive liberalization. Thus applying a
similar tool to climate policy may also seem reasonable.
However, there is neither convincing empirical evidence nor a sound theoreti-
cal basis in the global governance literature and, more speciﬁcally, how to promote
efﬁciency by imposing additional restrictions like milestones. What we ﬁnd is evi-
dence for markets, such as labor markets. Falk and Kosfeld (2006), for instance, have
provided evidence showing that an employer may suffer from imposing a minimum
performance threshold for her employees. Similarly, Berninghaus et al. (2008) found
1Without national commitments (“the business as usual” scenario) estimations predict an
temperature increase with possibly catastrophic consequences (Stern 2007, Latif 2010).
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sense, we will add to this literature, but not in an one-off interaction but in a recursive
interaction task.
What we consider is a recursive game where all players can gain by reaching a
certain ﬁnal common target. The situation can, however, be more strictly regulated
by imposing intermediate targets to be reached earlier. Thus, what regulation does is
imposing additional risks of failure. Our main milestone hypothesis predicts that ad-
ditional regulation via milestones, i.e. intermediate performance targets, is efﬁciency
enhancing.
Althoughourleadingexampleisenvironmentalprotectiontopreventglobalwarm-
ing, we have abstained from inventing a novel game and have tested the milestone
hypothesis with a familiar experimental workhorse to compare our ﬁndings to those
of other experiments. More speciﬁcally, we have used the familiar linear public goods
game (see Ledyard 1995, for an early survey of experimental studies) by interpreting
contributions as investments protecting the environment, e.g. investments in emis-
sion reduction to limit or prevent global warming.
Thus, milestones and contribution targets set lower bounds for emission reduc-
tion. If one of the milestones or the ﬁnal goal is missed, the rather dramatic effect
is that all players lose everything (all of their payoff) with a given probability. This
implies additional (subgame perfect) equilibria to the usual free-riding equilibrium
where the sums of the contributions so far exactly hit the targets.
We test the milestone hypothesis as treatment effects with milestones as one treat-
ment variable. Whereas for all treatments the ﬁnal target is the same we distinguish
between high milestones (H) and much lower ones (L), the latter rendering the mile-
stones rather inessential. We compare the H versus L – effects in three different sce-
narios leading to 2x3=6 different treatments. The three scenarios vary the individual
marginal productivity of contributions and the probability of losing everything if one
of the targets is not met.
In spite of the impressive tradition of public goods experiments (Ledyard 1995)
there are only few studies with focus on environmental protection. Milinski et al.
(2008) introduce and experimentally analyze a collective-risk social dilemma, framed
as dangerous climate change. The players were endowed with e40 each and could
continuously contribute e0, e2, or e4 to a “climate change account” over ten rounds.
If subjects failed to reach the threshold after the last round, they lost everything left
with a probability of 90%, 50% or 10%, respectively. Results show that even with a
losing probability of 90% half of the groups failed to reach the threshold.
Fischbacher et al. (2010) rely on a linear public goods-game, however, with only
3
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question whether milestones would be efﬁciency enhancing. They, on the other hand,
made their ﬁnal target stochastic by assuming that players receive either private or
common stochastic signals whose sum determines the ﬁnal target. We will compare
our ﬁndings with earlier related ones in the concluding section.
Section 2 describes our experimental design, including all treatments and the ex-
perimental protocol. In section 3 we present our results. Conclusions in section 4
round off the paper.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 General Setting
To capture environmental protection problems, e.g. avoiding global warming, we rely
on a linear public goods game (Isaac et al. 1985) as our experimental workhorse. Thus
monetarycontributionsmeantoinvestinemissionreductionforthesakeoflessglobal
warming whereas “free-riding” stands for voluntarily abstaining from any individual
attempt to protect the environment.
In all treatments ﬁve players, respectively participants i = 1,...,5, are endowed
with e = 65 tokens which they can either keep or repeatedly contribute over six peri-
ods t = 1,...,6. Individual contributions ci,t must satisfy 0  ci,t  10 guaranteeing
that after six periods each participant has something left. In all treatments, further-
more, all players i lose everything, i.e. what they have kept for themselves and what




i=1 ci,t by all ﬁve play-
ers, with a certain probability p 2 (0,1) if the contribution target of C6 = 150 tokens is
notreached(C6 < C6). Assumingconstantindividualmarginalproductivity(a  0.2)














ci,t + aC6) if C6 < 150.
Under the condition that a < 1  5a opportunism in the sense of own monetary
payoff concerns suggests to reduce the own contributions in both ranges C6 < C6 and
C6 > C6, as long as this does not mean that C6 becomes smaller than C6, whereas
a > 0.2 renders maximal individual contributions as efﬁcient (in the sense of payoff
maximization). Due to the discontinuity of the payoff function Ui at C6 there exist
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i,t = 60 for i = 1,...,5 serve
asourbenchmarkswhendiscussingactualbehavior.2 Sinceincaseof E0 noindividual
player i can guarantee that the target of 150 is reached, it is obvious that E0, based on
0-contributions throughout, is a (subgame-perfect) equilibrium. For E this holds, too,
since increasing å
6
t=1 ci,t above 30 is clearly suboptimal and contributing less than 30
would yield maximally 65 but only with probability p whereas one’s payoff from E
is Ui = 150a + 35 which is at least 65 due to a  0.2.
Note that the target C6 could already be reached within three periods by all ﬁve
players contributing maximally (ci,t = 10) in each of the three periods. Thus viewing
the ﬁrst three periods as a base game with already two strict (symmetric) equilibria
reveals that “ﬁnite horizon-Folk Theorems” (Benoit and Krishna 1987) can be applied
showing that there exists also non-stationary pure strategy (subgame perfect) equlib-
ria.
In all treatments subjects receive periodic feedback information, i.e. after each
period t = 1,...,6 all ﬁve players i = 1,...,5 learn about the individual contributions
cj,t of all players j = 1,...,5 and thus can react to such feedback information when
deciding on their next contribution ci,t+1. Obviously, this allows for reciprocity and all
sorts of disciplining actions by future dealings on which the so called Folk-Theorems
are based (Aumann 1981, Axelrod and Dion 1988, Benoit and Krishna 1985).
2.2 Milestones
Regulation is implemented by means of milestones (M), i.e. contribution targets on
the way of reaching the ﬁnal target of C6 = 150, namely C2 after period 2 and C4 after
period 4. Not reaching the intermediate targets has the same consequences as not
reaching C6. Although players i = 1,...,5 can already lose everything after period
2 and 4, they will in the experiment ﬁrst decide successively for all six periods t =
1,...,6. Only then it will be decided randomly in view of C2,C4 and C6 whether or
not they lose everything already after period 2, if C2 < C2, after period 4 if C4 < C4,
or ﬁnally if C6 < 150.
2To be clear the efﬁciency benchmark requires a > 0.2.
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cj,t. Comparing Ui with UM
i clearly reveals
that implementing milestones on a sufﬁciently high level implements “regulation”
where, in view of the environmental interpretation, the regulator is Mother Nature.
We predict a milestones effect, i.e. more efﬁcient performance with stricter milestones.
In order to test the milestones-effect we distinguish two cases:
1. strict milestones (H): C2 = 50 and C4 = 100, and
2. less strict milestones (L): C2 = 5 and C4 = 10.
For the case of “strict milestones” (H) we set the intermediate targets such that neces-
sary contributions to reach the ﬁnal target of C6 increase linearly. In the less strict case,
we do not omit the milestones, but lower them by a factor of 10 what should render
them inessential, such that payoff UM
i approximates Ui. The “philosophy” of such a
manipulation is, of course, that the two cases H and L rely on the same verbal instruc-
tions and differ only in two numerical parameters, namely C2 and C4, what should
induce no difference in (sub)conscious demand effects between H and L where “L”
stands for –actually very– “low milestones”.
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We consider three different scenarios to test the potential milestone effect by compar-
ing treatments with strict (H) and low milestones (L).
In the baseline scenario (B) we set a = 0.4 and p = 0.5 in combination with the
group size of 5.3 Since the probability of losing everything seriously increases the





i,t = 60 for i = 1,...,5
maybe expected more often than in usual public goods experiments.
Our experimental design could be criticized since linearly increasing total payoffs,
even above the ﬁnal target, may not adequately capture environmental conservation.
We therefore propose an alternative scenario (S) in which reaching the ﬁnal target C6
just conserves the status quo, i.e. a mean payoff of 65 tokens, and overshooting is not
beneﬁcial at all, i.e. by removing the efﬁciency of C6 > C6. This is done by lowering
the constant individual marginal productivity to a = 0.2. Of course, compared to
scenario B incentives to cooperate are also smaller below C6.
This manipulation changes two aspects: it questions the efﬁciency benchmark and
reducesthe free-riding“disincentives” asmeasured bythe expectedpayoff ofa unilat-
eral deviation from the E-equilibrium to constant 0-contributions (free-riding). The
difference in expected payoffs between the E-equilibrium and the payoff of a unilat-
eral deviation to constant 0-contributions for scenario B is 95   56.5 = 38.5 tokens,
whereas it is 20.5 tokens for scenario S only. Since by comparing these scenarios the
two effects, mentioned above, cannot be disentangled we consider a third scenario (P)
and preserve the equilibrium and efﬁciency benchmarks of the baseline scenario by
setting a = 0.4, but keeping the free-riding “disincentive” equal to that of scenario (S)
via lowering the probability of losing everything from p = 1/2 to 1/3.4 Altogether
this 2X3 factorial design results in six treatments as listed in table 1.
2.4 Experimental Protocol
We ran 12 separate sessions for the six treatments. 360 student participants were re-
cruited from various disciplines of Jena university using the ORSEE software (Greiner
2004). The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher 2007). In each session the 30 participants were subdivided in two equally
large matching groups of participants playing the 6 period-recursive games repeat-
3One might argue that setting a = 0.4 is unrealistic in a climate change setting, since in-
vestments in emission reduction are usually seen as preserving the status quo. This is because
sustainability is the main argument for policy intervention.
4The probability is calculated by comparing the individual payoff that results when all play-
ers i = 1,...,5 play E to the individual payoff that results for the player who deviates from E
by free-riding: (95  20.5) = (1  p)(65+ 0.4x120), implying p = 38.5/113  1/3.
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Milestones
H L
P a = 0.4; p = 1/3 PH PL
B a = 0.4; p = 1/2 BH BL
S a = 0.2; p = 1/2 SH SL
edly. After each play of the 6 period-recursive game the 15 participants of a matching
group were randomly rematched to form three new groups with ﬁve players each
who would interact in the next round of play. Since participants were only told that
they are randomly rematched, they should have expected that each of the 29 other
participants can become an interaction partner. This should even more have discour-
aged reputation effects (participants can, of course, try to establish some reputation
within the same rounds, i.e., across the six periods of a given round).
After entering the computer laboratory of the Max Planck Institute in Jena partic-
ipants received written instructions (see App. C for translated materials) which were
also read aloud to establish their common knowledge. After answering questions
privately participants had to answer a few control questions. The experiment only
started when all participants had answered all control questions correctly. A session
with altogether 12 rounds needed on average 90 minutes, including reading instruc-
tions, answering control questions and payment. Average earnings were e17 with
minimum e2.5, and maximum e29, including the e2.5, show-up fee.
3 Results
We describe our ﬁndings ﬁrst at the group level with a closer look at individual be-
havior afterwards. We do so by ﬁrst stating "Results" and then trying to justify them
by descriptive and statistical data analysis.
RESULT 1: Equilibrium play E and E0 is negligible.
Only 3 out of 144 groups end up in the E outcome of investing 150 tokens in total
(2 groups in treatment SH and one in treatment SL). One group in treatment SL was
able to coordinate on the fair share equilibrium of contributing 5 tokens each round.
No groups totally freeride or contribute the maximum possible. However, we are not
really interested in testing equilibrium outcomes but rather want to study treatment
8
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efﬁciency enhancing.
RESULT 2: Depending on the scenario, milestones increase the probability of reaching
the ﬁnal target.
Sinceexpectedpayoffswhennotreachingtheﬁnaltargetarelessthanwhenreach-
ing it, in all scenarios it is more efﬁcient to meet the ﬁnal target. Figure 1 shows the
probability of reaching the ﬁnal target, separated by scenario and treatment. In sce-
nario B and P almost all groups succeeded (10 of 12) and there is no signiﬁcant treat-
ment effect (H versus L). The picture slightly changes for scenario S with an almost
signiﬁcant milestones effect for the success probability in the ﬁrst run, where 8 ver-
sus 4 out of 12 groups reached the ﬁnal target (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.110). However,
the effect disappears since after the restart more groups, namely 6, succeeded in SL
whereas for SH there is no change (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.340).
Figure 1: Final target reached
RESULT 3: On the group level milestones increase average group contributions only
in scenario S.
Figure 2 depicts separately for the three scenarios (scenario B on top, scenario
S in the middle and scenario P at the bottom) and treatments average contributions
over the sequence of play, i.e. the six rounds of two runs. In the ﬁrst run of scenario
B average contributions are lower in the treatment with strict milestones (5.6 tokens
versus 5.98 tokens) and it seems that imposing additional risks by intermediate tar-
9
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(Mann-Whitney-U, p = 0.2142). For scenario S a signiﬁcant milestones effect shows
up in the ﬁrst run. Imposing milestones increases contributions by approximately 30
per cent from 3.78 to 4.93 tokens (Mann-Whitney, p = 0.0831) and is, hence, enhancing
efﬁciency. No signiﬁcant difference between treatments shows up in scenario P and,
moreover, in all three scenarios after the restart.
Thus, milestones increase the probability of success and contributions only in sce-
nario S, which features investments into emission reduction as conserving the status
quo by ruling out efﬁciency enhancement below and above C6.
RESULT 4: Analyzing individual contributions, milestones are inspiring them in sce-
nario S and P.
Thus, on the level of individual behavior by using panel regressions, the picture
for scenario P changes. The panel is by design strongly balanced and consists of 60
subjects per treatment cell (120 subjects per scenario). Taking group heterogeneity
into account we make use of a panel regression with adjusted standard errors on the
group level (each group is one cluster), e.i., in total 24 groups per treatment (48 groups
per scenario). Moreover, there exist 24 groups for each run and 48 groups for both
runs together. Contributions are explained by a dummy for the treatment with strict
milestones (PH), dummies for one session of the respective treatments (SPH and SPL),
lagged variables on own contribution, average contribution within the group and ac-
cumulated contributions. Regression results are shown in table 2. There are no signif-
icant treatment effects in the ﬁrst run (the ﬁrst two columns). However, in columns
three and four showing regression results for the sequence after the restart (second
run), the treatment dummy is positive and signiﬁcant. Controlling for sessions only
(column 3) the effect is signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level. Additionally controlling for
various forms of information which subjects get (column 4) results in a better ﬁt and
a signiﬁcant treatment effect on the 1 per cent level, however, lower in magnitude.
More precisely, subjects contribute on average 0.766 tokens more to the public good
with strict than with less strict milestones. Taking the two runs together in column 5
and controlling for the restart (including a dummy), the effect is weaker (on average
0.457 tokens more in SH) but still signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level, whereas the restart
dummy has no signiﬁcant effect.
The effect is stronger in scenario S (see table 3). Although, we do not ﬁnd a signif-
icant treatment effect after the restart, there is a strong and high effect in the ﬁrst run.
10
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 086Figure 2: Average contribution per treatment
Individuals in treatment SH contribute on average 1.080 tokens more with strict mile-
stones, when controlling for the received information (column 2). In contrast to sce-
nario P the milestones effect disappears after the restart (columns 3-4), but is present
when considering both runs, controlling for information and the restart (column 5).
Subjects in treatment SH contribute on average 0.873 tokens more than in SL, whereas
11
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 086the restart dummy is insigniﬁcant. Individual level analysis gives no further insights
for scenario B (see appendix A).
Table 2: OLS Panelregression with clustered standard errors on group level for
scenario P
run 1 run 1 run2 run 2 both runs
contribution contribution contribution contribution contribution
PH 0.872 0.160 1.261 0.766 0.457
(1.46) (0.65) (2.53) (2.93) (2.46)
SPH -0.294 0.308 -0.372 -0.00931 -0.0242
(-0.36) (1.07) (-1.59) (-0.06) (-0.13)
SPL 0.956 0.403 1.350 0.758 0.483
(1.18) (1.02) (2.29) (2.83) (1.68)
lag contribution 0.479 0.479 0.426
(7.00) (8.04) (10.08)
lag average contr. 0.320 0.109 0.171
(3.26) (1.01) (2.17)




cons 5.533 1.267 4.606 2.650 1.824
(19.27) (3.09) (9.97) (2.92) (3.97)
N 720 600 720 600 1320
NIndiv. 120 120 120 120 120
R2
O 0.0102 0.333 0.0193 0.301 0.227
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0.05,  p < 0.01,  p < 0.001
Although the non-parametric group level analysis suggests no milestone effect in
scenario P, we do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant milestones effect on the individual level control-
ling for group, session and information effects. Compared to scenario S the effect is
smaller in magnitude and less signiﬁcant. The milestones effect is therefore not only
driven by excluding efﬁciency above and below targets (scenario S), but also due to
higher free-riding “disincentives” (scenario P and S).
RESULT 5: The milestones effect in scenario S and P is mainly driven by a higher share
of individual contributions between 4 and 6 tokens.
To further scrutinize contributions on the individual level as well as the general
sequence of play we have classiﬁed contributions into low (0-3 tokens), medium (4-6
tokens) and high (7-10 tokens). Figure 3 shows the resulting relative number of contri-
12
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scenario S
run 1 run 1 run 2 run 2 both runs
contribution contribution contribution contribution contribution
SH 2.156 1.080 1.000 0.473 0.873
(3.90) (2.32) (1.60) (0.86) (2.21)
SSH -0.100 -0.128 0.333 0.359 0.0898
(-0.38) (-0.93) (1.07) (1.52) (0.58)
SSL 1.917 1.286 0.844 0.538 0.850
(2.82) (2.56) (1.32) (1.08) (2.15)
lag contribution 0.343 0.387 0.333
(3.68) (4.74) (5.75)
lag average contr. 0.0874 -0.0340 -0.0196
(0.51) (-0.17) (-0.16)




cons 2.822 1.052 3.717 2.079 1.949
(5.36) (2.41) (6.87) (2.78) (4.85)
N 720 600 720 600 1320
NIndiv. 120 120 120 120 120
r2
O 0.100 0.232 0.0363 0.165 0.171
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0.05,  p < 0.01,  p < 0.001
butions for the respective classes in the six treatments in the ﬁrst run.5 It shows that
contributions are quite heterogeneous. However, in treatment SH most contributions
(64.44 per cent) fall into the medium category. Compared to treatment SL, milestones
seem to discipline subjects to stay on the track to the ﬁnal target as the number of low
contributions is signiﬁcantly lower (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.000) and medium contribu-
tions are signiﬁcantly more frequent (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.000). A similar but not that
strong pattern is found for scenario P in which we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly lower frequency
of low contributions and a signiﬁcantly higher frequency of medium contributions in
treatment PH (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.025 for low and p = 0.002 for medium). No sig-
niﬁcant difference between contribution classes is found in scenario B (see also the
graphical illustration in ﬁgure 3). The share of contributions classiﬁed as high in sce-
nario S is signiﬁcantly lower than those in scenario B and P (Fischer’s exact, p = 0.000,
for BL vs. SL, BH vs. SH, PL vs. SL and PH vs. SH), whereas we do not ﬁnd any
signiﬁcant difference between B and P.
5In the following we show results for the ﬁrst run only. For the second run, the qualitative
results for the classiﬁcationare the same.
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RESULT 6: Milestones stabilize individual behavior over the sequence of play in sce-
nario S and P.
Is the classiﬁed behavior stable over the sequence of play? To answer this we
have, in addition to the classiﬁcation above, further subclassiﬁed the relative number
of contributions into three phases of rounds: round 1-2 , round 3-4 and round 5-6.6
The results of the classiﬁcation in scenario S are separately shown for the two
treatments (SL and SH) in ﬁgure 4. There is a relatively stable share of low contri-
butions in treatment SL over the three phases (Kruskall-Wallis, p = 0.3588), which
is signiﬁcantly higher than in SH (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.000 for round 1-2 as well as
round 3-4 and p = 0.004 for round 5-6). In contrast, a high and stable share of medium
contributions is found in treatment SH (Kruskall-Wallis, p = 0.5946), which is in all
three phases signiﬁcantly higher than in SL (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.000 for round 1-2 ,
p = 0.001 for round 3-4 and p = 0.004 for round 5-6). Thus the disciplining effect of the
milestones operates through medium contributions, i.e. subjects seem to coordinate on
medium contributions throughout. Subjects in treatment SL try to make the best out
of a bad job in round 5-6, with signiﬁcantly more contributions in the high class than
in the previous rounds (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.000). However, as shown in ﬁgure 1
6We choose this classiﬁcation to capture differences in play between rounds including a
target. Moreover, results qualitatively do not change if we take every single round into account.
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SH over the sequence of play shows that milestones stabilize average contributions
and thereby offer some intermediate planning reliability.













































In Scenario P (see ﬁgure 5) milestones have a signiﬁcant disciplining effect espe-
cially in the ﬁrst and second phase. The share of low contributions for PH is signif-
icantly lower than for PL (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.047 for round 1-2 and p = 0.052 for
round 3-4). However, low contributions in both treatments increase steadily indicating
that participants anticipate that total contributions will exceed the critical thresholds.
We also observe differences for the contribution class labeled as medium. In pase 1
and 2 medium contributions in treatment PH are signiﬁcantly higher than in treatment
PL (Fisher’s exact, p = 0.024 for round 1-2 and p = 0.005 for round 3-4). The ﬁnding
indicates that the milestones effect – as in scenario S – is driven by low and medium
contributions. The overall contribution patterns for both treatments (beside the differ-
ences mentioned above) look very similar.
4 Conclusion
To investigate if regulation by milestones - intermediate targets on the way to a long
term target - is efﬁciency enhancing we have imposed additional risks of failure on
the way to the long-term target. In the threshold public goods game featuring a ﬁnal
15












































target after six rounds not reaching the ﬁnal target leads to a loss of everything with a
given probability. The same consequences are assumed to occur if a milestone is not
reached. Treatments vary the magnitude of the milestones from less strict (approx-
imately inessential) to strict milestones (essential) and the marginal productivity of
contributions and thereby efﬁciency and free-riding incentives as well as the proba-
bility of loosing everything in case of failures.
We ﬁnd substantial differences between the three scenarios. Milestones do have
a positive impact on efﬁciency when there is no efﬁciency benchmark and free-riding
“disincentives” are low. The effect is strongest when higher contributions below and
above targets are not efﬁciency enhancing and free-riding “disincentives” are low, so
that investments into emission reduction can only preserve the “status quo”. A mod-
erate effect is found when efﬁciency can be promoted but free-riding “disincentives”
are still low. However, the result is mainly due to second run behavior. Since in the
context of climate change, there may not be a restart or a second chance, learning may
be too late. In the scenario with efﬁciency and low incentives to free-ride no mile-
stones effect is found.
Our results are similar to Milinski et al. (2008) ﬁnding that half of the groups
have difﬁculties in reaching the ﬁnal target. Note that they frame the game as cli-
mate change what might have increased contributions. Comparing our ﬁndings to
Fischbacher et al. (2010) who do not implement at all intermediate targets we conﬁrm
16
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 086their result that more serious losses when missing the threshold promotes coopera-
tion. It is interesting that commonly known targets (their common signal case), which
we have implemented in a deterministic way, seems to provide a best case scenario
for environmental protection. These and our observations imply that regulation by
milestones, depending on the speciﬁc scenario, can be efﬁciency enhancing.
One should be cautious when generalizing our conclusions. Since we do not cap-
ture advantages of early investments, our situation is kind of a worst case scenario for
testing the milestone hypothesis. In the case of environmental protection early invest-
ments can be seen as superior to late investments. Without early investments the costs
of climate conservation may increase because emissions accumulate and reaching a
certain emission reduction target becomes more difﬁcult (cf. Kemfert 2005). More-
over, environmental returns might need some time to develop and to accumulate. It
was not the scope of this paper to capture it but would be interesting topics of future
research.
Here, we implemented and manipulated milestones exogenously. This seems un-
realistic when thinking of environmental agreements in which milestones are usually
negotiated as done in Kyoto. Implementing endogenous milestones in such a setting
is tricky as it can not be based on punishments of Mother Nature. To do so, one has to
think of the consequences if a milestone is missed.
In the actual debate on climate change, discussing the investments into emission
reduction needed to preserve the long-term climate, milestones may be essential to
overcome the actual coordination problem. Intermediate targets, as proposed by in-
ternational environmental agreements like Kyoto, might help to solve the problem.
However, our results reveal a high risk of failure. This has to be kept in mind when
hoping for the milestone effects, especially when discussing coordination problems
with possibly catastrophic consequences. In our scenario milestones provide a pun-
ishment mechanism, imposed by nature, which is in reality may be lacking so far
and whose implementation by international agreements may be very problematic but
could be very helpful nevertheless.
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Table 4: OLS Panelregression with clustered standard errors on group level for
scenario B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
contribution contribution contribution contribution contribution
BH -0.367 -0.206 -0.400 -0.262 -0.315
(-0.66) (-0.46) (-1.94) (-1.52) (-1.40)
SBH -0.111 -0.187 -0.0389 0.0564 -0.0731
(-0.22) (-0.48) (-0.20) (0.33) (-0.35)
SBL -0.0889 0.186 -0.133 -0.0141 -0.0639
(-0.19) (0.56) (-0.21) (-0.03) (-0.21)
lag contribution 0.371 0.284 0.294
(5.61) (3.81) (5.93)
lag average contr. 0.213 0.263 0.0878
(1.69) (1.94) (1.02)




cons 6.022 3.509 5.794 3.466 3.956
(22.54) (3.89) (31.86) (3.99) (7.03)
N 720 600 720 600 1320
NIndiv. 120 120 120 120 120
r2
O 0.00341 0.214 0.00324 0.189 0.115
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0.05,  p < 0.01,  p < 0.001
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C Instructions (English translation for treatment BH)
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment! Please read these in-
structions, which are identical for all participants, carefully. For your arrival in time
you receive a show-up fee of e2.50. In the following experiment you will earn ad-
ditional money, depending on your decisions and the decisions of other participants.
During the course of the experiment, all amounts are stated in ECU (experimental cur-
rency units). At the end of the experiment all earned ECU will be converted in cash
and privately paid according to the following exchange rate:
1ECU = 0.10e.
From now on, please do not talk to your neighbors, switch of your cell phone, and
remove unnecessary things from your desk. It is important that you follow those rules
- otherwise we have to exclude you from the experiment and any compensation. In
case you have a question, please raise your hand and we will answer your question
privately.
The following experiment will last for 6 rounds and you will have to make a de-
cision in each of them. You are randomly assigned to groups of 5 participants which
remain ﬁxed over the rounds. At the beginning of the experiment each participant of
the group is once endowed with 65 ECU. Your task in each of the 6 rounds is to make
a decision on how to use the 65 ECU.
The decision problem
As already described, you are member of a group of ﬁve participants in which each
member is at the beginning endowed with 65 ECU. In each of the six rounds you have
the possibility to contribute any integral number between 0 and a maximum of 10
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being) for yourself. After each member has made its contribution decision to the joint
account, the next round starts, except for the sixth and last round.
The total income of each member of the group after the sixth round is calculated
as follows:
Income from the joint account = Sum of all contributions over six rounds x 0.4,
plus the ECU not contributed during the six rounds:
Total Income = Income from the joint account + not contributed ECU.
For example, if after 6 rounds the sum of contributions of all group members to
the joint account is 150 ECU, you and any other group member will receive an income
of 150 x 0.4 = 60 ECU from the joint account. Additionally, you and all other group
members receive the respective ECU that were not contributed to the joint account. If
after 6 rounds the sum of contributions of all group members to the joint account is
150 ECU and you have not contributed 35 ECU, you will receive 60 + 35 = 95 ECU.
Thresholds
The total income at the end of round 6 also depends on whether the sum of contribu-
tions into the joint account reached certain thresholds after the critical rounds 2, 4 and
6. The threshold for the sum of contributions after the second round is 50 ECU, after
the fourth round 100 ECU and after the sixth round 150 ECU. If the sum of contribu-
tions after a critical round did not reach the respective threshold, you lose your total
income with a probability of 50%.
All necessary random draws are made successively after round 6 (for the rounds
2, 4 and six). It means that you will make a contribution decision into the joint account
six times, but will be informed whether you lost your total income if a threshold has
not been reached after one of the critical rounds after the end of round 6. The result of
the random draws will then be displayed on your computer screen.
The probability of losing everything
If your group contributed less into the joint account than the respective thresholds
required after each of the three critical rounds (2, 4 and 6), you lose your total income
with a probability of 1/2+ 1/2 1/2+ 1/2 1/2 1/2 =875/1000(= 87.5%).
If your group contributed less into the joint account than the respective thresholds
required after two of the three critical rounds (rounds 2 and 4, 4 and 6, 2 and 6), you
lose your total income with a probability of 1/2+ 1/2 1/2 =75/100(= 75%).
If your group contributed less into the joint account than the respective threshold
required after one of the three critical rounds (round 2, 4 or 6), you lose your total
income with a probability of 1/2(= 50%).
In case your group has reached the respective thresholds after each of the three
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group members earn the income from the joint account (sum of contributions over six
rounds x 0.4) plus the ECU that you have not contributed.
If the sum of contributions to the joint account is less than 150 ECU after round
6, even though the thresholds were reached after the other two critical rounds before
(i.e. one of the three threshold reached), you and your group members lose the total
income with a probability of 1/2 (50%). With a probability of 1/2 (=50%), you are
receive the income from the joint account (sum of all contributions over six rounds
x 0.4) plus the ECU that you have not contributed. The probability of not losing the
whole income is reduced analogously if more than one threshold is not reached. After
each round you are told how much each member of the group has contributed to the
joint account.
Randomized Events
If thresholds are not reached, it will be randomly decided whether you lose your total
income after round 6. One number out of 1 to 1000 is randomly drawn. A number
between 1 and 500 translates into a negative result (you lose your total income), while
a number between 501 and 1000 translates into a positive result (you don’t lose your
total income). The number of random draws depends on the number of thresholds
that are not reached. We start, if necessary, with the threshold after round 2, followed
by, if necessary, the threshold after round 4 and ﬁnally, if necessary, the threshold
after round 6. After the six rounds, your total income, the results of potential random
draws and your earnings (in e) will be shown on the screen. After have ﬁnished
reading the instructions, please click Continue. Afterwards you are asked to answer
some comprehension questions.
Pleaseanswerthefollowingcontrolquestions. Theexperimentwillonlystartafter
all participants have answered all questions correctly.
1. Each group member is endowed with 65 ECU. Assume that all ﬁve group mem-
bers (including you) contributed 3 ECU in each of the 6 rounds to the joint ac-
count.
(a) In which critical rounds is the threshold reached (please mark the correct
answer)?
Round 2 and or
Round 4 and or
Round 6 or
None of the three rounds
(b) With which probability will you lose your total income?
......
2. Each group member is endowed with 65 ECU. After the second round, a total
4 ECU have been contributed to the joint account. In the third round, a total of
20 ECU and in the fourth round a total of 26 ECU are contributed to the joint
account. After round 6, 165 ECU have been contributed to the joint account.
(a) After which rounds is the threshold reached (please mark correct answer)?
Round 2 and or
Round 4 and or
Round 6 or
None of the three rounds
(b) With which probability will you lose your total income?
......
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get from the joint account?
......
3. Eachgroupmemberisendowedwith65ECU.Youcontributeaconstantamount
to the joint account in each of the six rounds. The other four group members
contribute the same amount to the joint account in each of the six rounds.
(a) What is the total income you get after round six if you and your group
members contribute in every round 10 ECU to the joint account?
......
(b) With which probability are you losing your total income if you and your
group members contribute in every round 0 ECU into the joint account?
......
4. A total of 155 ECU has been contributed to the joint account. After round six,
you have 10 ECU left.
(a) With which probability are you losing your total income if only the thresh-
old after round six has been reached?
......
(b) With which probability are you losing your total income if only thresholds
after round two and six has been reached?
......
(c) What is your total income (in ECU), if all thresholds has been reached?
......
Surprise restart (Instructions):
We are repeating this experiment once again. You are once more assigned to a group
of ﬁve, which will not change for the six rounds. Because of the high number of
participants it is very unlikely that you are assigned to the same group of ﬁve with
the same group members as before.
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